Safer healthcare at home: Detecting, correcting and learning from incidents involving infusion devices by Lyons, I & Blandford, AE
lable at ScienceDirect
Applied Ergonomics 67 (2018) 104e114Contents lists avaiApplied Ergonomics
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/apergoSafer healthcare at home: Detecting, correcting and learning from
incidents involving infusion devices
Imogen Lyons, Ann Blandford*
UCL Institute of Digital Health & UCL Interaction Centre, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 13 January 2017
Received in revised form
11 September 2017
Accepted 17 September 2017
Keywords:
Patient safety
Incident reporting
Qualitative research
Primary care
Infusion devices* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: imogenclyons@gmail.com (I. L
(A. Blandford).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apergo.2017.09.010
0003-6870/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elseviea b s t r a c t
Objective: Complex medical devices such as infusion pumps are increasingly being used in patients’
homes with little known about the impact on patient safety. Our aim was to better understand the risks
to patient safety in this situation and how these risks might be minimised, by reference to incident
reports.
Design: We identiﬁed 606 records of incidents associated with infusion devices that had occurred in a
private home and were reported to the UK National Reporting and Learning Service (2005e2015 in-
clusive). We used thematic analysis to identify key themes.
Results: In this paper we focus on two emergent themes: detecting and diagnosing incidents; and
locating the patient, lay caregivers and their family in incident reports. The majority of incidents were
attributed to device malfunction, and resulted in the patient being under-dosed. Delays in recognising
and responding to problems were identiﬁed, alongside challenges in identifying the cause. We propose a
process model for fault diagnosis and correction.
Patients and caregivers did not feature strongly in reports; we highlight how the device is in the home
but of the care system, and propose an agent model to describe this; we also identify ways of mitigating
this disjoint.
Conclusion: Devices need to be appropriately tailored to the setting in which they are employed, and
within a system of care that ensures they are used optimally and safely. Suggested features to improve
patient safety include devices that can provide better feedback to identify problems and support reso-
lution, alongside greater monitoring and technical support by care providers for both patients and
frontline professionals. The proposed process and agent models provide a structure for reviewing safety
and learning from incidents in home health care.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Globally, there is a trend toward healthcare in the home rather
than hospital (NRC, 2011; RCN, 2014). Changing patient de-
mographics, patient preferences, economic pressures to reduce
hospital admissions and length of stay, along with medical and
technological advances, have all contributed to the growth of home
care. Alongside growing numbers of patients receiving care for
chronic conditions, earlier hospital discharge has increased the
acuity of homecare patients (Lang et al., 2008). Consequently,
complex medical devices such as infusion pumps, feeding pumps,yons), A.Blandford@ucl.ac.uk
r Ltd. This is an open access articlventilators, etc., often designed for use by trained professionals in
clinical settings, are increasingly used in the home (Leff and Burton,
2001; NRC, 2011; Beer et al., 2014). As well as bringing beneﬁts,
these advances pose challenges for safety and effectiveness, and
bring new risks (Weick-Brady and Lazerow, 2006). The aim of the
work reported here was to better understand how safety is
managed when infusion devices are deployed in people's homes.
2. Background
The home environment differs from the hospital in important
ways (NRC, 2011). Typically, patients and caregivers are left alone
with medical devices for lengthy periods with limited, if any,
training. Consequently, technical or clinical problems may not be as
promptly identiﬁed and resolved as in hospital, where patients are
continuously monitored (Hilbers et al., 2013). Furthermore, homee under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
I. Lyons, A. Blandford / Applied Ergonomics 67 (2018) 104e114 105healthcare professionals (HCPs) work in relative isolation, without
immediate supervision or support, and often lack timely, conve-
nient access to equipment and resources (Lang et al., 2008). They
typically visit the home singly, or occasionally in pairs, and are
responsible for all aspects of a patient's nursing care; thus, the HCP
is responsible for the effective operation of all devices needed to
support a patient at home. However, they may have insufﬁcient
opportunities to develop skills with all the devices they encounter
(Hilbers et al., 2013).
Despite the growing prevalence of home healthcare, patient
safety research and human factors research in healthcare focus
predominantly on institutional settings (Macdonald et al., 2013;
Valdez et al., 2017; Werner et al., 2017). Some researchers have
suggested that the less structured nature of home care carries more
potential for adverse events than traditional care settings (Masotti
et al., 2010). There is, therefore, a need to better understand med-
ical device use in private homes and how people manage when
things go wrong.
Beer et al. (2014) report on challenges experienced by home
health care workers, considering a range of tasks (fromwound care
and bathing through to managing infusion administration). They
relate their ﬁndings to a model of human factors for health care in
the home that centres on the people, tasks and equipment involved
in home care. For infusion devices, the main challenges identiﬁed
by Beer et al. relate to set-up (e.g., clearing air from the line) and
troubleshooting; they highlight the need for more instructional
material and better training in these areas, and advocate stand-
ardisation of equipment as far as possible, to minimise the number
of devices each HCP needs to be familiar with. Vincent and
Blandford (2017) describe the work of home nurses, particularly
focusing on the use of ambulatory syringe drivers for palliative
care; they highlight the adaptations that caregivers have tomake so
that devices are ﬁt for purpose in the home setting and when pa-
tients are outdoors. The main safety feature discussed is the design
and use of a lockbox so that only designated health care pro-
fessionals can access the device. However, neither of these studies
focused speciﬁcally on how HCPs manage device failures or recover
from incidents involving infusion devices (or similar technology).
Others (e.g., Carayon et al., 2014; Wooldridge et al., 2017) have
advocated taking a human factors systems approach to patient
safety. They focus on describing the work system, the processes
involved in care, and the outcomes. Their focus is on the overall
system, and designing it to improve quality; this is a broader
question than that which we address in this paper. In this study, we
also adopt a human factors systems approach, but focus on the
causes of and recovery from incidents involving infusion devices
that occur in home health care. We propose process and agent
models that encapsulate key phenomena and support reasoning
about patient safety in this context.
In this study we examined incidents related to infusion device
use in private homes, reported to the UK National Reporting and
Learning System (NRLS). While in principle the NRLS accepts re-
ports from anyone, in practice nearly all reports are submitted by
HCPs (including all the reports analysed in this study). We focused
on infusion pumps because they have previously been identiﬁed as
a common cause of problems (Beer et al., 2014), are safety-critical,
and have been found to feature in more reports of incidents at
home than any other device (NRC, 2011). While the most common
use of infusion pumps at home is for palliative care near end of life,
they are increasingly being used at home to deliver other medica-
tions: e.g., for the management of long term conditions. Our aim
was to explore the characteristics of reported incidents associated
with infusion devices, and the circumstances surrounding their
causes, detection and resolution, to inform the design of future
devices and the systems of care in which they are used.3. Methods
Since this study involved the use of anonymised records where
permission had been obtained from the data provider (data sharing
agreement 002.13.DSA.UCL) and it was not possible to identify in-
dividuals from the information provided, it was determined that
the study complied with exemption 2 under the UCL code of ethics
(https://ethics.grad.ucl.ac.uk/exemptions.php).
3.1. Study design and context
We undertook a retrospective analysis of data from the NRLS,
which records patient safety incidents within NHS organisations in
England and Wales. The NRLS has deﬁned a patient safety incident
as any unintended or unexpected incident which could have, or did,
lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS-funded
healthcare (NPSA, 2011). Staff typically submit reports via a local
reporting system; these are subsequently uploaded to the NRLS
(Panesar et al., 2009; Thomas and Panchagnula, 2008). The list of
recognised incident types is long, from “Absconder/missing pa-
tient” to “Unplanned return to theatre” (NRLS, n.d.). Thus, the NRLS
is a comprehensive source of incident reports, covering all health-
care settings across England.
3.2. Search strategy and sample selection
17,741 anonymised reports from the NRLS were retrieved (see
Appendix A for search terms). The search covered 1st January 2005
to 31st December 2015. The data was provided as an Excel
spreadsheet; each record comprised 25 data items. Of these items,
two were identiﬁers (organisation and incident number); 16 had
originally been entered as a selection from a menu (deﬁning date,
location, incident type, etc.) and the remaining sevenwere free text
ﬁelds (enabling the reporter to add details). The majority of in-
cidents reviewed in this study were classiﬁed as “Medication” or
“Medical device/equipment” incident types.
We selected all 982 incidents categorised as occurring in a
“private house, ﬂat, etc.” These reports were reviewed; 177 were
excluded as the incident was not associated with an infusion device
or did not occur in a private home; six duplicates were also
excluded, leaving 799 reports, each relating to a unique incident.
3.3. Data analysis
Our analysis focussed on data from three of the free text ﬁelds:
‘Description of what happened’, ‘Actions Preventing Reoccurrence’,
and ‘Apparent Causes’. While the shortest report comprised only 20
words (across all three ﬁelds), the majority were 200e500 words in
total, and the longest was over 800 words.
We undertook a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) to
identify and report important themes within the data. Analysis
began by reading through each report and noting broad patterns.
Since our focus was on managing patient safety in therapies
involving the use of infusion devices, incidents that did not directly
involve the device (e.g., prescribing errors or poor documentation
of drugs in the home) were excluded. Incidents inwhich the patient
had, or might have, receivedmore or less medication than intended
had greatest safety implications; therefore, reports on other inci-
dent types (e.g., keypad not locked) were also excluded. In total, a
further 193 reports were excluded, leaving 606 reports in the ﬁnal
analysis. The analysis was completed by hand. We generated pre-
liminary codes, starting with a random sample of reports, revising
codes and organizing them into broader themes as further reports
were reviewed. The ﬁrst author conducted the analysis of reports
up to 2011, with discussion of emerging themes and interpretation
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then analysed by the second author, starting with (and reﬁning) the
coding scheme. Reports were re-analysed using the reﬁned and
agreed coding scheme (see appendix B). The coding of 10% of re-
ports (every 10th record from the 6th record in the dataset) was
checked in detail by the other author. Across these, 5 minor coding
discrepancies were identiﬁed and corrected. On this basis, we
judged the coding to be reliable.
Our initial focus was on trying to understand the causes of in-
cidents that occur in the home, with a view to developing recom-
mendations for mitigating such incidents; as the analysis
proceeded, it became increasingly apparent that reports yieldmuch
more insight into detection and recovery than to causes. As health
professionals typically only visit the home occasionally, we had
implicitly expected that patients, their families or lay caregivers
would be the “ﬁrst line of defence” in detecting incidents (and
might also be implicated in the causes of those incidents), and we
were surprised at how many reports did not mention these people
at all; this led us to analyse how lay people featured in reports.
4. Results
Two principal themes emerged from the analysis, and are dis-
cussed below:Table 1
Number and examples of incident types reported.
Incident type Number Exam
Device malfunctioned 278 Visite
rema
had n
be sa
Wrong dose administered e.g. Dose calculation or preparation error,
wrong concentration used, etc.
87 The m
had o
the 2
Interactions (accidental or intentional) with the device by a non-
health professional, including use of “boost” function where this
conﬂicts with policies of the reporters' organisations
37 … the
butto
… on
for ? H
been
was i
Device programmed incorrectly
e.g. wrong rate/volume entered, rate calculated incorrectly
(including where automatically calculated by the pump), wrong
syringe type selected, etc.
56 … do
in 11
per h
Patien
up in
There
pump
Incorrect set up of device and/or accessories
e.g. incompatible syringe size used, wrong battery used, pump not
fully closed, clamp not opened
42 … it w
and t
from
Occlusion
e.g. crystallisation of drugs, kinks or bends in the giving set or
needle, etc.
54 Syrin
reduc
from
was c
Medi
buckl
The 1
mixed
crysta
was n
Curre
syring
Start button (presumed) not pressed 10 Visite
ﬁnd n
starte
the a
Damage and degradation
e.g. broken equipment, water damage, etc.
8 Patien
durin
batte
nause Detecting and diagnosing incidents
 Locating the patient, family and lay caregivers in reports
Before discussing those themes, we summarise the kinds of in-
cidents that featured in reports. Illustrative extracts from reports are
reproduced verbatim, including spelling and grammatical errors
and capitalisation as written by the original reporter. Where a sec-
tion of text has been removed to make an illustrative extract more
succinct, this has been marked by “[…]”, and “ …” indicates that
more text preceded or followed the extract taken from a report.
Over 75% of incidents reported involved an under-dose. In some
cases the patient received none of the prescribed medication. In
almost half of infusions involving an under-dose, patients had
received some medication before the infusion terminated unex-
pectedly. A smaller number of patients received the infusion at a
slower rate or were administered a lower dose than prescribed.
Over-infusions were often identiﬁed when the infusion ﬁnished
ahead of schedule. Incident types and examples are reported in
Table 1.
Nearly half the incidents were attributed to equipment mal-
functioning. Devices were frequently observed to be ‘not working’
or have ‘stopped’, without further explanation. In several cases the
device functioned once re-started, suggesting use errors or occlu-
sions, although this was rarely stated explicitly.ple extracts
d to reload syringe driver, noted driver malfunctioned. Approx 25 mm ﬂuid
ined in syringe, therefore syringe driver had malfunctioned approx 23.00h. Alarm
ot sounded on driver, light was not ﬂashing on unit. Needle site checked found to
tisfactory […] Sryinge driver replaced with functioning unit … (Report 173)
idazolam was prescribed at 30 mg and came in vials of 10 mg in 2 ml. The error
ccurred as the nurse thought this was prepared as 10mg in 1ml therefore 20mg in
ml vial and drew up 2 vials and wasted half instead of 3 vials. (Report 113)
patient stated that when handling the driver, she accidentally touched the 'stop'
n and stopped the infusion. (Report 112)
arrival the syringe had delivered the total dose already and had remained empty
ow long (due to complete at 1700). On questioning the [home] care staff, they had
informed by GP to administer medication via the boost button when the patient
n pain. (Report 103)
sage had been changed from 50mgs in 100ml at a rate of 4 mgs per hour to 60mgs
ml at a rate of 5 mgs per hour. The ﬂow rate on the pump was changed from 4mgs
our to 5 mgs per hour but the volume was not altered. (Report 87)
t syringe driver to be re - sited as skin tissued. Re - sited using medication drawn
the syringe in the morning, primed line and re - started the McKinley T34.
fore, remaining medications were calculated over 24 h automatically via the
, rather than the remaining 16 h … (Report 297)
as discovered that the syringe was not correctly positioned in the syringe driver
hat a clamp was positioned over the extension tubing occluding the ﬂow of drugs
syringe driver to patient. (Report 160)
ge driver check - light ﬂashing, machine whirring, but 17 mls loading dose not
ed since initial set up late afternoon. Syringe buckled and bent at an angle away
machine. On removal of soft set it was noted that soft set had not pierced skin and
urled up in a tiny ball pressed against the skin, (leaving a red indentation.
cation unable to ﬂow through soft set and therefore backed up causing syringe to
e. (Report 201)
2 ml syringe supplied with the pump contained a mixture of 4 different drugs
with sterile water. The drugs had precipitated within the syringe and had
llised around the exit port of the syringe and luer connector of the infusion line. It
ot possible to push the plunger of the syringe with normal force expected …
nt practice would advise that no more than 3 drugs are to be mixed within a single
e … (Report 172)
d patient to check syringe driver which had been set up the evening before, only to
one of the medication had infused as it appeared the syringe driver had not been
d. I started the S/D and checked the light was ﬂashing, all appeared in order and
larm did not go off… (Report 285)
t provided with syringe driver with no battery cover… Device stopped working
g night as battery kept popping out. Patient attempted to tape syringe driver
ry to try and keep it in place to no avail. As a result he had breakthrough pain and
a. (Report 37)
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e.g.:
… syringe driver infusion line was leaking . the night nurses
changed the line and reﬁlled the syringe driver with half the pre-
scribed dosage which resulted in client receiving only half the
prescribed dose as the infusion rate was not changed …
(Report 200).
Overall, incidents varied widely and it was frequently difﬁcult to
determine causes or contributing factors from the reports. Reports
give greater insights into the process of detecting and trouble-
shooting, as discussed in the following section.
4.1. Detecting and diagnosing incidents
Three themes emerged on detecting and diagnosing incidents:
cues that alert nurses, patients or relatives to a problem; detective
work undertaken by nurses investigating the incident; and delays
and missed opportunities. Some reports also discussed remedial
actions, as discussed at the end of this section.
4.1.1. Cues and signals
Incident reports reveal various strategies to determine whether
a device was functioning correctly. The most common reported
signal of a problem was an unexpected amount of ﬂuid remaining
(Table 2). This was frequently reported with other visual and
auditory cues, most notably the presence or absence of a light,
motor noise or alarm. Following a Rapid Response Report (NPSA,
2010), healthcare providers in the UK replaced many of the
pumps used at home (Vincent and Blandford, 2017), resulting in a
shift in the type of visual and auditory cues most commonly re-
ported (more references to alarms; fewer to ﬂashing lights or motor
noises); this highlights the importance of interaction design for
helping people detect and diagnose incidents. Indirect cues
included deterioration in the patient's condition and nurses' re-
ﬂections on their own or others' actions.
According to incident reports, informal caregivers rarely detec-
ted any cues and signals other than device alarms: other cues were
noticed by health professionals when visiting. E.g.:
The family informed me the syringe driver had been making noises
and ﬂashing red lights. On inspection the syringe driver was not
administering the medication.
(Report 460)
4.1.2. Detective work
Nurses were rarely present when incidents occurred, so subse-
quently played a detective role, piecing together information fromTable 2
Signals and cues used to determine functioning of infusion devices.
Number
Unexpected volume of ﬂuid remaining (including ﬁnishing early) 232
Device alarm 145
(Absence of) ﬂashing light 88
Patient's condition or symptoms 64
Screen displaying fault, error or incorrect information (including
blank screen)
56
(Absence of) motor or ‘whirring’ noise 39
Review of documentation and stock, checking programming,
reviewing device log
39
Physical appearance of the device or contents e.g. positioning of the
syringe, crystallisation
37
Reﬂection on practice 7different sources to diagnose the problem (Table 3). Common checks
included the physical and mechanical set-up, and programming of
the device, the battery, and condition of the infusion site. In more
recent reports, there are occasional references to accessing a device
log for information. Conversely, in earlier reports there are more
references to nurses replacing the battery or repositioning the sy-
ringe. These trends are probably due to changes in the devices most
commonly used for palliative care in the UK (NPSA, 2010; Vincent
and Blandford, 2017). Other than these speciﬁc issues, there are no
discernible differences in the nature or volume of reports over the 11
years covered in the analysis reported here.
Nurses also sought information from others present e e.g.,
whether patients or caregivers had heard the device alarm or re-
ported pressing buttons. Nursing notes, documentation, and
medication stock counts sometimes helped with piecing together
what had happened, or the device's service history was checked.
4.1.3. Delays and missed opportunities in recognising, reporting and
resolving errors
A tiny minority of reported incidents were detected and
addressed while the infusion was being set up (possibly because
such incidents are not reported if they are resolved quickly).
Typically, these near misses involved calculation or preparation
errors, detected by the person responsible. Incidents were more
commonly discovered during scheduled visits, resulting in a sig-
niﬁcant delay before the problem was identiﬁed (Table 4).
Several factors contribute to delays andmissed opportunities for
resolving problems. Firstly, the frequency and quality of checking
processes: many infusions were not monitored over 24 h. Incidents
where no prescribedmedicationwas delivered suggests inadequate
checking when the infusion was set up. In several instances,
problems were misdiagnosed and troubleshooting efforts failed,
delaying resolution of the problem. E.g.:
night nurse visited to given planned stat dose of medication . found
syringe driver to be faulty and alarming . records showed she
attempted to ﬁx but unsuccessful, therefore turned device off . This
left the patient without continuous pain relief and antiemectic . No
evidence that the nurse thought to swap the device to another
driver (spare was available in the home !)
(Record 620)
Delays also occurred when patients or caregivers failed to
recognize or respond appropriately when the device alarmed.
People sometimes ignored or silenced alarms, or attempted to
troubleshoot themselves; in some cases this exacerbated the
problem or created additional problems. However, in many cases
this was a deliberate decision: e.g., at night when patients felt
symptoms were adequately controlled. E.g.:
Patient stated she ' pressed' buttons to resume the infusion . […] The
log has been noted and an occlusion and antibolus reverse occured
9 times over the 12 hours . […]appeared that the rate of the pump
was changed by the family
(Record 484)
Patient states the syringe driver had been alarming through the
night, however the patient had pressed the button to silence the
alarm rather than call the evening service
(Record 566)
4.1.4. Remedial or corrective actions
Remedial actions were reported in approximately 60% of re-
ports. The most commonly reported actions were replacing, re-
Table 3
Sources of information for detecting and diagnosing incidents.
Information source Example extracts
Device checks Arrived to replenish syringe driver and þ15.5 mls of original 17 mls of medication remained unadministered in
20 ml syringe in driver. Light not ﬂashing, motor not going, no crystallisation in syringe, access site in tact nil
tissueing, nil alarm had been heard … (Report 180)
Information from patient, family or
lay caregivers
… Patient states that the syringe was over ﬁlled þ therefore not positioned in the driver correctly. Because the
plunger was still moving along the alarm did not sound þ alert the patient to the problem Patient did not receive
any of her medication overnight. . Factors: Patient states that the nurse seemed very unsure of herself when
setting up the syringe driver. . (Report 240)
Review of documentation and medication Visited patient on [date] to re - load his syringe driver. In carrying out the task I noted that a drug calculation error
had occurred. Patient was due to received 150 mg Morphine Sulphate and 150 mg cyclizine over 24 h. Morphine
Sulphate available was 30 mg/ml 5 amps needed cyclizine is 50 mg/nl - 3 amps needed. On the previous
3 days 5 amps of cyclizine had been used each day alongside the 5 amps morphine sulphate … (Report 211)
Reference to event log the staff member changed the site but failed to switch off the driver so 1.5 mls was lost - this was conﬁrmed
with the download from the driver (Report 562)
Table 4
Sources of Delays and missed opportunities in detecting and resolving errors.
Example extracts
Delayed detection District nurse arrived at patient home to re - change two syringe drivers. On arrival patient complaining nausea
had vomited previous day and also complaining of pain. Syringe driver sites checked and not tissued, syringe drivers
both checked, when checked noticed both drivers were still full of medication ad both drivers were at 14 mls 48 mm)
therefore the patient had not received any medication since 11:00am the previous day … (Report 177)
Inadequate checking … On assessment of syringe driver on [date] at 1100 h, syringe driver switched off with a full syringe of medication
not administered … Discussion held with member of staff involved to ensure that she is up to date with syringe driver
training and that she is aware of the need to press the boost button to restart the syringe driver again and to ensure that
the syringe driver check list is completed each time. (Report 238)
Misdiagnosis and failed troubleshooting Patients son rang OOH D/N between 00:01 and 01:00 [date] reporting that the syringe driver alarm was sounding.
Incident reporter advised him to change the battery, this appeared to work as the light was ﬂashing and motor sounding.
08:30 [dateenext day] message received reporting patient was agitated and in pain. IR attended at 08:50 to assess and
give subcutaneous medication as prescribed, patient was comfortable and settled within 10 min. Syringe driver checked
had 8 ml left and was due for re - priming in 2 h - light ﬂashing and motor sounding. Vistaed to re - prime driver at
12:00 noted that syringe plunger was engaged with the drive screw, the patient had not been receiving medication from
the driver. (Report 228)
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battery or giving set, re-siting the cannula, or stopping the infusion.
In many cases, there was a need to supplement the patient's
medication (e.g. with oral doses). E.g.:
I tried numerous times to get the machine started and used about 4
new batteries . I encountered the same problem each time . In the
end I had to administer stat doses of Midazolam and Oxynorm
(Report 625)
Fewer than 10% reported any monitoring or follow-up to check
the problem was fully resolved (reporters may not consider it
necessary to include such information in incident reports).
4.2. Locating the patient, lay caregivers and family in incident
reports
About a third of reports contained no reference to the patient
involved. In a further third the patient was only mentioned as an
object. This may be because many incidents involved patients
receiving end-of-life care. However, a small proportion of patients
played an active role in detecting and reporting problems, facili-
tating investigation and monitoring the infusion. Conversely, 29
patients had an active, although not necessarily intentional, role in
triggering the incident through interference with the device (e.g.,
over-use of a boost function).
Caregivers, family and occasionally friends also identiﬁed and
reported issues, and provided information to assist investigations
in about 25% of incidents. In under 10% of reports, the family were
instructed on how to monitor for or avoid future incidents.Conversely, some HCPs refused to train patients or families in how
to ﬁx problems when they occurred, as they considered it to be a
HCP responsibility. Examples of these different kinds of incidents
are included in Table 5.5. Discussion
In this study, we analysed records of incidents associated with
infusion device use in private homes, aiming to better understand
risks to patient safety, how these risks might be minimised, and
how both practices and technology might better accommodate the
realities of home care. The majority of incidents were attributed to
equipment failures. Our analysis revealed delays in identifying
problems and missed opportunities for resolution. Based on our
analysis, we propose a process model of incident occurrence,
detection, recovery and learning.
Despite incidents usually occurring in the absence of health
professionals, patients and caregivers did not feature strongly in
reports. Based on our analysis, we also propose an agent model,
highlighting the overlap between the home system and the care
system.We highlight implications for the design of medical devices
for home use and the broader systems of care in which they are
employed.5.1. Detecting, recovering from, and learning from incidents
Based on the analysis summarised above, we developed a
process model of incident occurrence, detection, troubleshooting,
and learning. This model is derived from the coding scheme that
was developed in this study (Appendix B). The following outlines
Table 5
Example extracts locating the patient, lay caregivers and their family in incident reports.
No reference to the patient in report On [date] unable to ascertain amount of drug used due to omission of documentation on [detail removed]
Controlled Drugs Record sheet. Unclear notes made in [detail removed] Evaluation sheet. . On [date þ 1day]
unable to ascertain amount of drugs used as no documentation on [controlled drug record sheet]. Syringe driver
not left in working order as found on [dateþ 2 days]. . Syringe driver re - primed with drug as prescribed, loaded
onto machine. Start button pressed and infusion began. Unused syringe removed from house, solution
discarded, syringe put aside. Documentation removed. (Report 135)
Patient mentioned as an object Visited patient to check syringe driver and I noticed the driver was off, no display and the patient was groaning
in pain. On checking the patient notes it was documented in the evaluation notes that the district nurses had
visited and set up the driver at 12.15 h, however on looking at the syringe it appeared that none of the
medication had gone through and there was still approximately 21.4 mls of medication in the syringe driver
since it was set up. The relatives said the patient was in pain all day … (Report 505)
Involvement in detection and investigation … The syringe driver had switched itself off and the family stated that they had heard the motor working until
around 12am midnight but had not noticed it working in the morning. (Report 98)
Troubleshooting … Family noted the syringe driver was not working they had changed battery but pump continued to alarm and
then stop completely. DN team contacted and when driver checked intermittently showing battery ﬂashing and
then stopping (Report 370)
When the nurse arrived the patients wife reported that she had turned the driver off as the bleeping was
distressing the patient; she then turned it back on again and stated that she just kept pressing the yes button
until it started working. (Report 469)
Patient or family “tampering” with device … ONCE SYRINGE REMOVED PATIENT SILENCED ALARM BY PRESSING BUTTONS ON THE DRIVER PUMPWHICH
UNFORTUNATELY RESET DRIVER BACK TO 24 HOURS WHEN SYRINGE INSERTED RATHER THAN REDUCING BY
THE PRIMING LINE. AS NIL MORE DRUGS WERE IN THE HOUSE DRIVER UNABLE TO BE RE DONE. PATIENT
INFORMED OF THE ERROR WHICH SHE ADMITTED SHE HAD INFACT PRESSED BUTTONS AND WAS HAPPY TO
TAKE ORAL PAIN KILLERS IF NECESSARY. . (Report 590)
Patient/family intentionally not informed … on replenishing the syringe driver I noted that the syringe driver had been set up incorrectly and was running
at 2mls per 24 h. There was over 14mls of medication remaining which the patient had not received, the patient
had remained unsettled and needed several additional doses to settle him that day. Previously [patient name]
wife had mentioned that the out of hours nurses were laughing in the bedroom and that she felt this was a little
inappropriate under the circumstances, she also commented that they were in the room an awfull long time. The
family were unaware of the mistake as I felt it would be inappropriate under the circumstances and only cause
further distress to an already tense situation. (Report 340).
Family requested incident report Syringe driver checked on my arrival showing 44 h 03 min left to run. Volume to be infused 12.7 ml Volume
infused 4.7 ml at a rate of 0.29 ml per hour. Yellow label syringe barrel stated 60 mg Diamorphine and
Haloperidol 10 mg and water for injection made up to 18 ml so Patient not getting the correct prescription. […]
The daughter of the Patient also made a speciﬁc request that incident forms were completed, I assured her they
would be. […] (Report 397)
Family recruited for subsequent monitoring of device All staff made aware of incident and patient reinstructed on how to monitor the driver and to contact his nurses
if any concerns (Report 616)
Patient requested training; request refused by HCP Patient asked if he could try sorting it out himself if it happend again. I informed the patient that he should call
out a district nurse to sort the problem if it happend again and documented this in the notes. [next day] T34
syringe pump had been alarming all night with occlusion. Patient informedme that he had been tampering with
the pump throughout the night but could not stop it from alarming (Report 492)
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covery (Fig. 1):
1. The ﬁrst step is the setting up of the device to administer
medication. The details of this step are beyond the scope of this
paper (and are rarely recorded in incident reports); this is the
ﬁrst point at which either equipment malfunction or human
error might be detected.
2. More commonly, the device is left running, and its performance
is monitored (by patient or family) to a greater or lesser degree.
The running device is systematically monitored during subse-
quent visits from a HCP; failures are most commonly detected
during a routine visit from a HCP.
3. Occasionally, a patient or family member interacts with the
device (e.g., to administer a bolus dose, or moving the device
and accidentally knocking or dropping it). This is (in principle,
though rarely in practice) another opportunity to monitor ac-
tions and the device state, to detect failure.
4. In practice, failure can occur during any of setup, running, or
subsequent interaction. Failure is only acted on once it has been
detected.
5. Once a failure has been detected, there is usually an attempt
diagnose the cause, drawing on sources of evidence as discussed
above, in order to correct the failure. Diagnosis sometimes in-
volves further interaction with the device (Feedback loop 1) e
whether by patient, family member, or HCP.6. All failures need to be corrected. In practice, nurses often pri-
oritise correction over diagnosis (e.g., by replacing a device
without fully understanding the cause of failure, or by simply
restarting the device and allowing it to run again e Feedback
loop 2).
7. Once a particular incident has been resolved, it might be a
source of more general learning: about how to avoid a similar
incident in future, or how to detect and correct it more quickly if
it does occur. This learning might pertain to the individual, but
more commonly involves review and reﬂection at a team or
organisational level (Feedback loop 3).
The two key stages in this process are detection of failures (or
errors) and correction. In principle, learning is also important, but
incident reports contain relatively little information about organ-
isational learning. This model highlights the different opportunities
for providing feedback mechanisms that can help people to detect,
correct and learn from incidents.
5.1.1. Timely error detection
Previous studies have identiﬁed routine checks as the most
prevalent error-detection mechanism. Thomas and Panchagnula
(2008) reported that, in critical care, routine checking of infusions
at handover, breaks or patient transfer often limited patient harm.
Opportunities for checks are more limited in homecare (Lang et al.,
2008). Although nurses detected most incidents during routine
Fig. 1. A process model of incident occurrence, detection, management and learning.
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incidents involved infusions inwhich no medicationwas delivered;
Keay and Callander (2004) suggest a ﬁnal check should be carried
out 10 min after starting an infusion. Current UK nursing standards
stipulate all intravenous dose calculations should be independently
checked and, where possible, double-checking of administrations is
recommended (Keers et al., 2015). This could reduce delays in error
detection and recovery. However, such recommendations have
resource implications. Technological innovations could have an
important role; for example, remotely connected devices could
allow professionals to monitor the progress of an infusion, be
alerted when something goes wrong, and support troubleshooting
from a distance.
Where patients or relatives detected a problem, the most com-
mon indicator was a device alarm. Conversely, failures of alarms to
sound delayed problem identiﬁcation. Efforts have recently focussed
on reducing device alarms in hospitals where alarm fatigue may
cause nurses to become desensitized (Sendelbach and Funk, 2013). In
home care, where routine checks are infrequent, alarms are vital for
identifying problems. Alarms should be tailored to the demands of
the situation (ECRI, 2014); our study highlights the value of device
alarms in homes (but also the importance of people being able to
silence them when needed).
More effective feedback through stages 1e4 (Fig. 1) could help
with timely error detection by both health professionals and pa-
tients/family. This should include easier ways to identify discrep-
ancies between the intended and actual infusion rate and more
informative device feedback (particularly alarms).
5.1.2. Diagnosis and correction
The number of incidents associated with device failures high-
lights the need for devices for home use to be robust. However,
there is insufﬁcient information in reports to understand how or
why devices failed, or whether particular devices were more likely
to malfunction. Previous studies suggest that staff assume equip-
ment is faulty while subsequent review found it was used incor-
rectly (Thomas and Galvin, 2008); incident reports rarely include
that kind of follow-up. Reports do show that health professionals
often struggle to identify the cause of problems (Stage 5, Fig. 1).
This has implications for device design and procurement.
Twenty years ago, Obradovich andWoods (1996, p.584) highlighted
the problem of poor device feedback in home infusions:
“… the device often provides little or no feedback to help the
user realize that an error has occurred or to aid her in under-
standing what has led to surprising changes in device behavior.There is little feedback about the amount of medication being
delivered and whether it matches the therapy plan.”
Little has changed in the intervening years. Devices with an
easily accessed log that records settings and alarms can facilitate
diagnosis in some circumstances; just 15 reports referred to this
feature. Easier availability, and more systematic use, of reports
could reduce reliance on second-hand information from patients
and relatives.
In addition, these ﬁndings highlight the need for accessible and
immediate specialist technical support. The most common
corrective action reported was replacement of the device. Whilst
this may be a justiﬁed response, it represents inefﬁcient resource
use if the device is not faulty. A quick conversation with a techni-
cian or specialist nurse could help identify and rectify problems
without needing to source a new device or, conversely, recognize a
need to replace the device immediately to avoid further incident
(Stage 6, Fig.1). Such a service could beneﬁt patients and caregivers,
as well as nurses who encounter an unfamiliar problem or device
and, for efﬁciency, could be coordinated across different organisa-
tions or regions.
Every incident potentially represents an opportunity for
learning (Stage 7, Fig. 1); while incident reports give little infor-
mation on broader learning from incidents, this process model
highlights this as an essential step in making any Health Service
into a learning organisation.
5.2. The infusion device at the boundary of home and care
Beer et al. (2014) propose a model of health care in the home
(key features reproduced in Fig. 2). Their model emphasises the
different attributes of nurse and patient as people within the care
system, and the role of the device in supporting the task (in this
case, of medication administration).
Our analysis, particularly focusing on how patients and family
are located in reports, leads us to propose an alternative model for
infusion devices, which are controlled by the nurse (or other HCP).
Given that all the incidents involved infusion devices supporting
the task of medication administration, we merge device and task,
for simplicity. We propose an agent model locating the device,
patient and nurse straddling the home and care systems, while
other elements of the home system are excluded from the care
system, and other elements of the care system fail to support the
home system well (Fig. 3).
As Beer et al. (2014) note, the home care nurse is, in many
Fig. 2. Proposed model of health care in the home (adapted from Beer et al., 2014).
Fig. 3. The principal agents (human and technology) and lines of communication in
the home care system focused around medication delivery via infusion device.
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role of the nurse as mediating between doctor and patient, at least
in the task of medication administration: while the doctor has
other involvement with the patient, s/he has little direct contact
with the device or involvement in the details of care delivery where
that involves infusion devices. The nurse is responsible for deliv-
ering care to the patient and for managing and troubleshooting the
infusion device. The patient is attached to, and therefore potentially
aware of the state of, the device, but rarely interacts with it directly;
family members may be caring informally for the patient, and may
be aware of (or even interact with) the device, but are largely
excluded from the aspects of care that involve the medical device.
Importantly, although the infusion pump is in the home, it is not
of the home; rather, it is of the care system, but physically removed
from that system. This highlights the potential value of reviewing
the role of patients and family as contributors to patient safety and
aligning the home system and the care system (as medical devices
play an increasingly important role within that system) more
closely.
5.3. The role of patients and caregivers in patient safety
Patients and relatives can have an important role in patient
safety, and be a source of resilience in healthcare (Schubert et al.,
2015; Holme, 2009). For instance, Unruh and Pratt (2007) identi-
ﬁed examples of patients detecting, preventing and recovering
from medical errors in outpatient cancer care. In our study, some
patients and family were important actors in detecting the prob-
lem and alerting professionals. However, this was not commonlyreported. Similarly, Saranto et al. (2012) found 82 of 785 incident
reports from one Finnish hospital contained information about
patients' and relatives’ involvement in events reported by staff; in
more than half of those reports the patient themselves noticed the
incident and notiﬁed the hospital.
Introducing medical technology in the home changes not only
the care setting but also the roles and information needs of pa-
tients, relatives and professionals; which must be considered in
strategies for improving safety in home care (Obradovich and
Woods, 1996; Blais et al., 2013; NRC, 2011). Unruh and Pratt
(2007) suggest that to contribute to safer healthcare, patients
need more information. The NRC (2011) report also highlights the
importance of training for both professional and lay caregivers
(including patients self-managing) that is focused speciﬁcally on
the circumstances of the home environment. Our analysis shows
that lay people could have a proactive role in monitoring infusions
by attending to cues frequently used by nurses, but ﬁrst need to be
made aware of the amount of ﬂuid that should have infused in a
given period, as well as what actions to take if they observe a
discrepancy. Beer et al. (2014) caution that untrained patients or
caregivers are more likely to misinterpret information and risk
making an incorrect judgement in response to a malfunction. We
found relatives’ efforts at troubleshooting were largely unsuccess-
ful and sometimes detrimental (successful troubleshooting may
not be reported as an incident). Additionally, it may be inappro-
priate to further burden patients, especially those at the end of life,
and families with this work (Mair&May 2014). In a study of patient
and caregiver perspectives on home haemodialysis, Rajkomar et al.
(2014) recommended that device alarms should not just signal a
problem but also provide information about likely causes and so-
lutions; they observed one device that featured an alarm showing
whether to call a nurse or technician for guidance. Designing de-
vices in this way could improve safety and reduce the burden on all
users when things go wrong. Designing devices and training fam-
ilies so that devices ﬁt better within the “home system” (Fig. 3)
could contribute signiﬁcantly to patient safety.
Revisiting Fig. 1 (the process model of diagnosis, correction and
learning), we can identify stages where the patient or family do or
could have an important role; this is summarised in Table 6.
5.4. Limitations
Researchers using incident report data have consistently
acknowledged the poor quality of this data (Panesar et al., 2009;
Sevdalis et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2015). In common with other
studies, we found reports typically contained limited information
to understand causal or contributory factors, or to inform preven-
tion (Thomas et al., 2011; Cousins et al., 2011; Rees et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, they provide substantial information about the ex-
periences of nurses and, to a lesser extent, patients in trouble-
shooting when things go wrong.
The data covers 11 years. Some of the earlier reports related to a
type of syringe driver which has since been phased out (NPSA,
2010). Some issues (e.g., over-use of the “boost” button, and bat-
tery problems) are more prevalent in earlier reports than more
recent ones. However, dominant issues such as delays in detecting
problems and difﬁculties in troubleshooting have persisted over
the 11 years of reports analysed.
Under-reporting of incidents is widely acknowledged. Our aim
in this study was not to quantify the frequency of these events but
to explore and better understand the types of incidents that occur
and how such risks might be mitigated in future.
Finally, Interactions with infusion devices are, with the excep-
tion of patient controlled analgesia, almost exclusively the re-
sponsibility of HCPs. The agent model presented above does not
Table 6
Locating professionals, patients and families in the process of detecting, diagnosing and recovering from incidents.
Process step Roles for HCPs Roles for patients and family
Setup Setting up and monitoring for any errors. Double checking
recommended where possible
Currently no role.
Could monitor or work with HCP if trained to do so to spot
any unexpected actions or outcomes
Run Typically absent so cannot monitor except when visiting.
Remote monitoring might alert staff earlier to problems.
Little evidence that patients or families are actively
monitoring device to check correct performance.
They could be trained to be more aware of the device state.
Interact Few instances of failure being caused by HCP interaction after
setup were identiﬁed
Failures were occasionally caused by patients or families interacting
with a device (e.g., knocking it or pressing buttons)
Failure HCPs note various cues and signals as presented above (Table 3). Typically aware of audible and visual alarms but not of
other indicators of failing device.
Should alert HCP to problems
Diagnose HCPs sometimes struggle to diagnose problems properly.
Better support from the care system (e.g., technical backup) and/or
training and/or device design could support diagnosis.
Devices could be designed to support people in
diagnosing problems and knowing how to resolve
them or who to call. Training could also help.
Correct HCPs often either replace or restart the device Patients and families might try restarting the device,
but cannot replace without help.
Learn Learning can involve the individual, team or organisation,
but depends on the HCPs being able to understand what went
wrong well enough to make it a learning experience.
There are few examples of families/patients being given
guidance on how to monitor or troubleshoot devices.
Training could be improved.
List A List B
/\bAbbott\b/i
/\bAlaris\b/i
/\bArcomed\b/i
/\bArgus\b/i
/\bAscor\b/i
/\bAtom(\s)medical\b/i
/\bB(\s)Braun\b/i
/\bBaxa\b/i
/\bBaxter(\s)Colleague\b/i
/\bBaxter(\s)Ipump\b/i
/\bBodyguard\b/i
/\bBraun\b/i
/\bCADD(-j\s)Legacy\b/i
/\bCADD(-j\s)Prizm\b/i
/\bCADD(-j\s)Solis\b/i
/\bCarefusion\b/i
/\bMcKinley\b/i
/\bCME\b/i
/\bCMExpress\b/i
/\bCodan(\s)argus\b/i
/\bCurlin\b/i
/\bDai(\s)wha\b/i
/\bDelphi\b/i
/\bDeltec\b/i
/\bEden\b/i
/\bEureka\b/i
/\bFoures\b/i
/\bFresenius(\s)Kabi\b/i
/\bGemini\b/i
/\bGrasby\b/i
/\bgraseby\b/i
/\bGreen(\s)pump\b/i
/\bHospira\b/i
/\bInfusa\b/i
/\bInfusion(\s)pump\b/i
/\bIradimed\b/i
/\bVTBI\b/i
/\bvolume(\s)to(\s)be(\s)infused/i
/\binfusion(\s)rate/i
/\bpressed\b/i
/\bbutton/i
/\bdevice/i
/\bprogrammed\b/i
/\bdisplay/i
/\binterface/i
/\bmiscalculation/i
/\bcalculated/i
/\bcalculation/i
/\bover(-j\s)?infus(?:edjion)/i
/\bunder(-j\s)?infus(?:edjion)/i
/\broller(\s)clamp/i
/\buser(\s)error/i
/\bfree(\s)ﬂow/i
/\balarm\b/i
/\bover(-j\s)?dose/i
/\bunder(-j\s)?dose/i
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sponsibility of the patient (such as blood glucose meters for people
managing diabetes); for those, the agent model proposed by Beer
et al. (2014) represents the situation more accurately. We antici-
pate that the agent model identiﬁed in this study will generalise to
other complex medical devices where responsibility for their use
resides with HCPs. We believe that the process model presented in
Fig. 1 generalises well e not just to other medical devices, but to
other systems that involve setup and monitoring.
6. Conclusion
Research in hospital settings suggests that infusion devices are
associatedwith risks to patient safety. Risks associatedwith devices
used in the home are poorly understood. Despite their limitations,
incident reports help us to understand the types of incidents that
occur, and identify areas of concern and potential solutions. In this
paper, we have identiﬁed considerations for the design and pro-
curement of medical devices for home use, for training (Table 6),
and for the broader system of care to improve patient safety, with a
particular emphasis on strategies for timely detection, investigation
and mitigation when incidents occur. We have proposed two
models, derived from our analysis, of the process of fault detection,
remediation and learning (Fig. 1) and of the overlapping systems of
home and care (Fig. 3).
Devices should be designed for the unique environment of the
home, be more robust and provide feedback that helps users to
identify and troubleshoot problems. Care services should also
provide greater monitoring and oversight of medical devices used
in the home setting, whether remotely, in person, or by further
training and engaging patients and caregivers, and should provide
easy access to specialist technical support when required.
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The search terms used to retrieve data from NRLS (at least one
item from list A AND one from list B).
Incident date between 01-Jan-2005 and 31-Dec-2015 (inclusive).
(continued )
List A List B
/\bIvac\b/i
/\bIvantage\b/i
/\bJMS\b/i
/\bLMA\b/i
/\bM16\b/i
/\bMedifusion\b/i
/\bMedima\b/i
/\bMedis\b/i
/\bMedrad\b/i
/\bMicrel\b/i
/\bMicrofuse\b/i
/\bMicropump\b/i
/\bMoog(-j\s)?aitecs\b/i
/\bMP100\b/i
/\bMP101\b/i
/\bMPdaily\b/i
/\bOmnifuse\b/i
/\bPainsmart\b/i
/\bPCA\b/i
/\bPEGA\b/i
/\bPega\b/i
/\bPhoenix\b/i
/\bPump\b/i
/\bSamtronic\b/i
/\bSigma\b/i
/\bSmiths(\s)MS\b/i
/\bSummit\b/i
/\bSyramed\b/i
/\bSyringe(\s)driver\b/i
/\bSyringe(\s)pump\b/i
/\bT34\b/i
/\bTerumo\b/i
/\bUniversal(\s)medical(\s)technolog/i
/\bVen(n)?er(\s)medical\b/i
/\bVolumed\b/i
/\bVolumetric(\s)infusion(\s)pump\b/i
/\bWalkmed\b/i
/\bZimed\b/i
/\bZol(l)?(\s)medical\b/i
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Incident type
Wrong dose administered (not right wrt prescription).
Device malfunction, including:
Battery failed
Device leaking
Occlusion (at set up or later)
Incorrect set up of the device and/or accessories, including:
Extravasion
Syringe or giving set incorrectly positioned or loaded in the
device
Device programmed incorrectly (e.g. incorrect calculation)
Start button not pressed
Interference or tampering with device (including use of boost).
Unclear (including multiple incidents and cascading events).Outcome
Under infusion e including no medication delivered.
Over infusion e including delivered too fast.Detecting and diagnosing incidents
Cues and signals
Alarm.
Flashing light.
Screen displaying fault or error.
Physical appearance of device, accessories or contents.
including evidently off
Motor noise.
Unexpected volume remaining.
Patient condition or symptoms.
Routine review of documentation and stock (inc. Device log and
programming).
Reﬂection on practice.
including reports from others on their practices
Not reported.
Detective work
Device checks and trouble shooting
Visual and aural cues.
Physical set up.
Pump programming.
Condition of site.
Checking or replacing battery.
Turning off and on.
Second hand information
Other professionals.
Patient or family.
Review of documentation or stock.
Event log.
Delays or missed opportunities
Detected on routine visit.
Patient/family or professionals failed or delayed reporting.
Adequacy of checking.
Misdiagnosis or failed troubleshooting.
Absence of, or inadequate, alarm.
Unavailability of staff.
Family locked out from ﬁxing.
No replacement available.
Remedial or corrective actions
None reported.
Device reset or restarted.
Infusion stopped.
Battery replaced.
Device replaced.
Syringe or giving set replaced.
Cannula re-sited.
Monitoring or follow upchecking back later.
Alternative medication administered.
Actions preventing reoccurrence
Device sent for further investigation or servicing.
Staff training and development.
MHRA report/manufacturer informed.
Focus on process rather than learning.
Individual responsibility (emphasis on staff vigilance and dou-
ble checking).
I. Lyons, A. Blandford / Applied Ergonomics 67 (2018) 104e114114Review or change practices, including:
keeping spare device/stocks to hand
upgrading device/giving set
Staff member suspended.
Locating the patient and family in reports
Patient
No reference.
Subject only.
Active role:
Detection/reporting
Investigation
Interactions with deviceFamily/Caregivers
Detection/reporting.
Investigation.
Monitoring.
Interactions with device:
Troubleshooting
Not informed
Informed about incident
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